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Abstract 
Intrusion Detection Systems have emerged as a method to provide a second layer of security 
in today's computer networks, in addition to proprietary mechanisms such as authentication 
and encryption. Currently, they are in use in wired networks, and are now also being adapted 
for use with networks that operate in the wireless environment. Several different types exist, 
the main classifications are anomaly or rule-set to signify detection method, and host-based 
or network based to signify where and which type of trace data is collected. The limitations 
and requirements on an IDS system in the wireless environment are different from that of the 
wired environment, especially in terms of trace data collection and communication. 
Distribution, multi-layer integration, and cooperation have been identified as key issues here. 
Bluetooth is a wireless communication standard that is not currently in widespread use, but is 
expected to gain popularity over the next few years. It provides a standard that functions as a 
basis for low-cost wireless communications solutions. 
We propose an Intrusion Detection System design for the Bluetooth Protocol Stack. In our 
approach, we adapt the concepts of distribution, multi-layer integration and cooperation to 
this protocol. Our Intrusion Detection System design is for a combined anomaly and rule-set 
IDS, where each node carries its own instance of the IDS system, and trace data is collected 
from all layers of the Bluetooth Protocol Stack. Focusing specifically on a scheme for 
cooperation between IDS systems at different nodes, we facilitate this communication via 
secure channels on the application level. 
1.0 Introduction 
1.1 Problem Statement 
Intrusion Detection is becoming a very powerful asset in the world of computer 
security. Most existing systems operate in wired networks and handle information gathering, 
data analysis and event response accordingly. In wired networks the topology is relatively 
fixed, and it is usually only changed with the addition or removal of nodes. Also, there is a 
definite notion of the boundary of a network, and also of the division between an 
organization's internal network and the outside world. 
Wireless ad-hoc networks are quite different. The topology of such networks can 
change on a dynamic basis as nodes move in and out of range of each other, as the operating 
environment changes, or simply as they open and close air-links between each other. Entire 
networks can be established and tom-down at any point in time, and there may not be any 
boundaries defining internal networks. 
An Intrusion Detection System attempts to discover intrusions and either stop their 
progress, or gather information about them to prevent them from reoccurring in the future, or 
possibly do both. The concept of intrusion detection is the same for both wired and wireless 
ad-hoc networks, but different conditions, as well as constraints and limitations exist in a 
wireless environment. 
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1.2 Research Overview 
The basis for the research is the Bluetooth Protocol Stack with Security Architecture. 
This project aims to investigate the details of intrusion detection in wireless ad-hoc networks, 
and to apply the knowledge gained to design an intrusion detection system for Bluetooth ™ 
wireless ad-hoc networks. The final result will be a design outlining the details of an IDS 
system capable of cooperation over the airlinks with other IDS systems. A case study 
example for a network under jamming is also given. 
1.3 Literature Review 
J.P. Anderson [1] was the first to introduce the idea oflntrusion Detection. An 
intrusion attempt or threat is here defined to be the potential possibility of a deliberate, 
unauthorized attempt to perform one of the following: to access or manipulate the 
information stored in a computer system, or to render said system in an unreliable or 
unusable condition. The work does not encompass an actual intrusion detection system, but 
rather entails the use of trace data to detect and accumulate evidence of computer misuse. 
Heady et. al. [2] provide a more updated definition of an intrusion; any set of actions 
that attempt to compromise the integrity, confidentiality or availability of a resource. This 
paper describes the architecture of a network based intrusion detection system in detail. It 
also explains the essentials of trace data collection on the network level, and how to use it to 
detect intrusions based on either a rule-set or anomalous behavior. 
Mukherjee et. al. [3] also describe network based intrusion detection. They provide a 
broad overview of network based intrusion detection, those IDS systems that monitor 
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network traffic through monitoring packets on the network. The advantage to these systems 
is that they can discover distributed network intrusions in real-time. The disadvantage is that 
a network based IDS will not know anything of what effect the intrusion may or may not 
have had on a particular host. 
Proctor [4] describes intrusion detection in great detail, encompassing many aspects 
of the topic. Describing network-based as well as host-based intrusion detection, those that 
collect trace data from log files on the host(s), the author also gives the reader a firm grasp on 
how these systems operate in different network configurations. In addition, Proctor explains 
the difference between misuse and anomaly detection schemes. Misuse detection requires 
less storage space and processing power than anomaly detection, but can only detect 
intrusions based on previously known signatures. Anomaly detection on the other hand 
attempts to find intrusions based on deviations from normal behavior recorded during a 
learning period, but requires larger amounts of processing power and storage space. Since 
the two methods cover different aspects of intrusion detection, they are now often combined. 
Zhang and Lee [ 5] discuss the details of intrusion detection in the wireless 
environment. They explore the differences from the IDS systems that operate in the wired 
environment, and go on to conclude that necessary characteristics of an IDS in the wireless 
environment include distribution of IDS systems and integration of multiple layers in the 
collection of trace data. Finally, the authors describe a framework for an anomaly-based 
intrusion detection system that involves these characteristics. 
Zhou and Haas [6] explore the security aspects of wireless ad-hoc networks. 
Considering the issues of availability, confidentiality, integrity, authentication and 
nomepudiation, they provide a detailed analysis of the security threats facing these networks. 
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The authors explore new approaches to secure communication in the ad-hoc wireless 
environment and build a security framework where a new key management service forms the 
core. 
Lee and Stolfo [7] develop models for intrusion detection using key ideas of data 
mining to find consistent patterns in system and user behavior that can in turn be used to train 
an IDS. They propose an architecture where agents collect trace data and provide updated 
behavioral parameters for use in detection, in order to meet the requirements developed in the 
modeling process. 
Moran [8] is the Core Specification of the Bluetooth Standard for wireless 
communication. This document forms part one of the basis for Bluetooth technology. It 
encompasses the design details of every layer in the protocol. Link establishment, data 
transfer and link tear down, as well as interoperability with other technologies, security and 
authentication are key issues. 
Moran [9] is the Profile Specification of the Bluetooth Standard and explains the 
various predefined usage scenarios of the Bluetooth Standard, called the Profiles. There are a 
total of thirteen profiles, and this document describes how various applications are intended 
and required to use the protocol elements provided in the Bluetooth Specification, in order to 
achieve the desired functionality and interoperability. 
Haartsen [10] describes the details of the Bluetooth Radio System, detailing how the 
transmission of data over the airlink is performed. The topics encompass physical 
transmission characteristics and interference in the wireless medium, as well as logical data 
transmission between nodes. 
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Gehrmann [11] explains the security measures of the Bluetooth Standard in more 
detail, encompassing authentication as well as encryption. Both encryption and 
authentication is handled by different versions of the SAFER+ algorithm, and the distribution 
of the secret keys is not handled over the airlink, but rather manually. Additionally, a 
Security Management module can be used to handle security policies in Bluetooth by 
enforcing secure communication for individual links and services when desired. 
Jakobsson and Wetzel [12] explore the weaknesses in the security measures of the 
Bluetooth protocol. In particular, they discuss vulnerabilities pertaining to the key exchange 
protocol, determination of location, and the cipher that is used by Bluetooth. The authors 
also suggest possible improvements to the protocol, but there is currently no mechanism or 
detection system in place to protect a Bluetooth network against future intrusions that take 
advantage of these and other shortcomings of the security procedures in place. 
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1.4 Author's Contributions 
We have adapted the concepts of distribution, multi-layer integration and cooperation 
to the Bluetooth Standard, and have developed an Intrusion Detection System Design for the 
Bluetooth Protocol Stack. Our System involves a combined anomaly and rule-set approach 
to detect intrusions, and we have designed a format for log trace data storage, as well as a 
packet format for use with secure encrypted communication channels between peer IDS 
systems. We have also developed a scheme for cooperation between the different instances 
of the IDS system in the wireless environment. 
We use a new Notification Packet to send information between these IDS system 
instances to facilitate cooperation. Our application level design format of the Notification 
Packet is a unique contribution of this thesis. Our design format uses the encryption scheme 
presented in [21] and is developed specifically to fit the Bluetooth Protocol Stack and our 
IDS system. The information sent is comprised of identifiers for the node sending the 
Notification Packet, the network (piconet) it belongs to, as well as a trace of the log that 
caused the notification to be sent. 
The format we propose for log storage entries of trace data is also a unique 
contribution of this thesis. It includes a timestamp, a type field, of our design, to specify 
which part of the Bluetooth Protocol Stack the information came from and thereby also 
which format it is in, and finally the information collected, in the format corresponding to the 
type field entry. In this way, we allow the IDS system to incorporate and use the header and 
signaling information formats that are already in use in the Bluetooth Protocol Stack. More 
specifically, our IDS system can distinguish between the different formats used at each layer 
in the Bluetooth Protocol Stack, to further facilitate intrusion detection through cooperation. 
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Finally, our efforts appear to be the first towards an IDS specifically designed for the 
Bluetooth Standard. 
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2.0 Theory 
2.1 Intrusion Detection in Wireless ad-hoc networks 
Wireless ad-hoc networks are significantly different from wired networks in aspects 
of communication between nodes and the absence of a fixed infrastructure scheme. Due to 
this, there is no notion of a perimeter or protected zone that can be established by running 
firewalls and intrusion detection systems at certain points in such networks. To begin our 
analysis, we will first look at wired networks. 
In a wired network (figure 1), the IDS can function as a single, centralized unit with 
responsibility for detecting intrusions. Due to the fact that the infrastructure is stable, i.e., it 
does not change except from the occasional addition or removal of a node, the IDS can in this 
way obtain trace data from, and detect intrusions on, the entire network. 
Ext . Network X 
Firewall X I Ext. Network Y 
Node A Firewall Y I 
IDS Node D 
Node B Node C 
Figure 1. IDS in wired networks . 
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Since ad-hoc networks are of such a character that they spontaneously and 
continuously change topology and members and the medium is inherently insecure, each 
node must be capable of defending itself. At the same time, they can perform a cooperative 
effort if trust between them can be established. This means that an IDS system in a wireless 
ad-hoc network must be distributed, as shown in figure 2. 
Node A 
IDS Agent 
NodeE 
NodeB IDS Agent 
IDS System 
NodeC NodeD 
IDS Agent 
IDS Agent 
Figure 2. Central IDS, with agents, in a wireless ad-hoc network 
As far as distribution goes, there are two main possibilities. One is to have a central 
decision entity or IDS system located in a designated node (Node Bin figure 2), which 
collects information from agents elsewhere within the network. This approach is most useful 
in wired networks where this information can be collected by a centralized unit over a secure 
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channel. The second approach, shown in figure 3, involves placing an entire IDS system at 
each node, fully capable of protecting the local system on its own. 
In wireless ad-hoc networks, the transmission medium itself cannot be used to easily 
facilitate a centralized collection of information. Several conditions make this infeasible. 
First of all, it could easily create data traffic delays; agents located at each node would need 
to send trace data back to the centralized unit for each data packet received, effectively 
increasing the time required to transmit successfully in an already error prone environment. 
Buffering does not pose a solution to this problem, as trace data would still need to be 
propagated at some pre-specified interval. Secondly, there is no notion of a fixed member in 
wireless ad-hoc networks, and requiring the IDS system at one node to keep track of all the 
others is not feasible due to limitations in battery power and memory storage; hence a 
distributed approach must be used. 
Node 3 
Node2 G G ---z__ ~ 
/V Node4 ~ G Node 1 
G Node5 G 
Figure 3. Distributed IDS in wireless ad-hoc networks 
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Each node in a wireless ad-hoc network must have its own instance of an intrusion 
detection system [5]. In this way, it will be capable of collecting information on its own 
channel links with other nodes, and the limitations in battery power and memory storage will 
be addressed. By letting each node collect, process and make a determination as to whether 
or not an attack is on-going or intermittent on its own collection of data, there is no need for 
any one node to keep track of raw trace data from other nodes. 
However, though each node has it's own instance of the IDS system, it is not intended 
to be stand-alone if cooperation is at all possible. It is essential that a node can incorporate 
evidence of intrusions from its peers rather than having to wait for attacks against itself to be 
able to detect them. This allows for a quicker response and a safer system; it reduces the 
chances a rogue node has to make intrusions into the system. 
Even though communication between nodes' IDS systems in wireless ad-hoc 
networks cannot be facilitated in the same way as in wired networks, it is still an essential 
part of the IDS system and needs to be carefully designed. Because the medium is shared, it 
is imperative that the IDS instance at any one node has the ability to communicate to the 
other nodes in the same network that an attack is intermittent or ongoing once a positive 
decision has been reached. At the same time, it is important that adversaries are unable to 
read this information. Therefore, secure communication must be employed in the form of 
encrypted channels between the IDS systems located at the different nodes in the wireless ad-
hoc network. 
When considering the case of an attack that encompasses jamming, though, this 
encryption will not help. However, as we will discuss in our case study, these channels still 
have the potential to remain open and usable. Since it is the inability to receive that causes 
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loss of data, the node(s) affected can still be able to transmit their information to those nodes 
that have not yet been attacked. 
This communication must be performed in real-time to prevent delay and the 
possibility of reuse of the attack pattern. Consequently, information regarding the attack 
must then be passed on to the node's peers, so that they can incorporate the decision into 
their own determination processes of whether or not they are under attack, as well as which 
response to generate. 
Secure communication needs to be employed to prevent potential intruders from 
interfering with the operation of the IDS system, and also to prevent "interference" between 
different IDS systems that are operative in ad-hoc networks that are in the same area. 
Within each wireless node, data collection and intrusion detection must be possible at 
all layers in the protocol used. Furthermore, it must be possible to relate the data collected at 
any one layer to data collected at the other layers. This must also be performed in a manner 
that allows the evidence to be accumulated and used to further trace a perceived attack before 
a definite decision is made and the other nodes are notified. In addition, information 
regarding the attack must then be passed on to the node's peers, so that they can incorporate 
the decision into their own determination processes of whether or not they are under attack, 
as well as which response to generate. 
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2.2 Bluetooth 
The Bluetooth protocol is a technology that provides for relatively easy establishment 
of wireless ad-hoc networks. The scheme is a master-slave configuration with up to 7 active 
slaves in each network, in addition to 255 parked (inactive) slaves. Networks, called 
piconets (figure 4), can also be combined to form larger networks, called scattemets (figure 
5). This is achieved by having a parked slave of a particular piconet temporarily either 
becoming the master of its own piconet, or an active slave in another piconet, while 
parked. 
Figure 4. Bluetooth Piconet. 
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Piconet Z 
Slave Z2 
Figure 5. Bluetooth Scattemet. 
The Bluetooth Protocol Stack (figure 6) has ten layers, including an optional 
interface. It can also have a separate security management module with native databases for 
storing security policies. 
The Application layer consists interchangeably of Bluetooth Profiles, Adopted 
Protocols and Stand-Alone Applications- any of which may use the services of a lower 
protocol layer. The Profiles are predefined usage scenarios [9] that entail how various 
applications are intended to use the Bluetooth technology. Adopted Protocols currently 
include PPP, TCP/IP, OBEX and WAP/WAE [14). In addition, users of the 
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Applications Security 
- Bluetooth Profiles Mgmt 
- Adopted Protocols 
- Stand-alone applications 
~ 
..-
SDP I RFCOMM I TCS-BIN 
L2CAP I AUDIO 
HCI 
I LMP I 
Baseband 
Bluetooth Radio 
Figure 6. Bluetooth Protocol Stack with Security Architecture. 
technology may develop individual, stand-alone applications that interface directly with the 
upper layers of the Bluetooth Protocol Stack. 
The Service Discovery Protocol (SOP) is used to define and provide information, as 
to which services are available at the current device, what characteristics they exhibit, as well 
as information relating to the device itself. Devices query each other in a client-server 
scheme using this protocol layer to determine the above-mentioned information. 
The TCS-BIN layer defines Telephone Control primitives, specifically for call control 
signaling in order to set up speech and data calls among Bluetooth devices. This is a bit-
oriented protocol, and it also provides procedures for mobility management in groups of 
Bluetooth devices using the TCS-BIN protocol layer. 
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RFCOMM is a protocol layer solely for the purpose of cable replacement. It 
functions by encapsulating data from the higher layers in a serial port emulation scheme, 
similar to the RS-232 serial port standard. 
Logical Link Control and Adaptation Protocol (L2CAP) handles multiplexing 
between higher-level protocol connections, segmentation and reassembly, as well as Quality 
of Service control. It permits a maximum packet size of 64 kB, and handles only 
asynchronous connectionless links. Audio and telephone applications requiring synchronous, 
connection oriented links are usually run over the AUDIO layer of the Bluetooth protocol. 
The HCI or Host Controller Interface is an optional layer that functions as an 
interface between the upper and lower layers of the Bluetooth protocol. It is most commonly 
used in the event of a divided implementation, where the lower layers are residing on a 
module, e.g. a wireless network card, and the upper layers of the protocol are implemented in 
software on a host, e.g. a portable lap-top. The lower parts of the protocol are in this case 
referred to as the Bluetooth module, and the upper parts as the Bluetooth host. 
The LMP or Link Manager Protocol handles link setup and control, as well as the 
generation, exchange and control of security primitives used for authentication and 
encryption. This layer also controls the power modes and duty cycles of the Bluetooth 
Radio. As LMP packets contain no data for the higher-level Bluetooth layers, they are 
filtered out by the LMP protocol. 
The Baseband layer enables the physical radio channel between different Bluetooth 
devices. It is responsible for synchronization of the frequency hopping sequence, as well as 
the clock, with that of other Bluetooth devices in the same piconet. Both synchronous, 
connection oriented and asynchronous connectionless links are carried over this layer and 
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error correction and encryption is also performed here. Finally, the Bluetooth Radio is the 
physical interface, enabling transmissions in the wireless medium. 
Bluetooth also allows for 3 different levels of security; non-secure, service-level and 
link-level, where non-secure is without any security measures, service-level requires slaves 
using a particular service to authenticate and use secure communication, and link-level 
requires authentication and secure communication on an individual slave-by-slave basis. The 
algorithm used to achieve this is a modified version of 128-bit SAFER+, and different 
algorithms are used for the authentication and data encryption procedures. The use of either 
mode 2 (service-level) or mode 3 (link-level) security can be achieved by implementing a 
security management infrastructure (shown in figure 5), for example as defined in chapter 
eight of [14], pages 290 through 308. 
As briefly mentioned in the description of the HCI layer, the Bluetooth Protocol Stack 
can logically be divided into two parts, the module and the host. The Bluetooth module is a 
collective reference to the Bluetooth Radio, Baseband and Link Manager Protocol layers. 
The Bluetooth host is the collection oflayers above the HCI layer, namely the L2CAP, 
AUDIO, RFCOMM, SDP, TCS-BIN and Application layers, as well as the Security 
Management module. The HCI layer acts as an interface between the Bluetooth module and 
the Bluetooth host. The standard specifies a number of different states of operation for the 
Bluetooth module and host, and an intrusion detection system in such a network will have to 
be operative corresponding to all states of the network protocol's different layers. 
Also, Bluetooth defines a strict master-slave transmission scheme, and though nodes 
are allowed to participate in several networks, they may only remain active in one network at 
any one time, and there is no appropriation for routing between different individual networks 
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(piconets) in the standard. Nevertheless, it will be important to retain the security of the 
airlinks a Bluetooth node retains regardless of which piconet it is currently active in, or how 
often or for how long a time interval it switches between the initial piconet and a new 
piconet. Consequently, the IDS system will have to support piconet switching and must also 
be able to adapt to future changes such as the addition of routing, or updates to the algorithms 
and internal workings of the IDS system. 
To put the Bluetooth technology into perspective, it can be compared to the OSI 
model, as well as the closely related TCP/IP protocol stack (figure 7). The OSI model 
consists of seven layers, from the Application layer through the Physical layer [14]. In 
TCP/IP, the services of the three uppermost layers in the OSI model are combined into one 
single Application layer, which provides definitions for application interactions with the 
network, data formatting, presentation, conversion and encoding, as well as procedures for 
opening, maintaining and closing a connection between network devices. The Transport 
layer in TCP/IP is formed by the TCP and UDP transport protocols to ensure reliable data 
transmission, whereas the IP layer handles routing procedures, correspondent to the Network 
layer in the OSI model. The TCP/IP protocol stack also encompasses Datalink and Physical 
layers whose functions fulfill the intentions of those layers as put forth in the OSI model. 
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Application Application Applications: 
- Bluetooth Profiles 
Presentation - Adopted Protocols 
- Stand-Alone Apps 
Session 
Transport TCP UDP 
Network IP 
Data link Datalink SDP I RFCOMM I TCS-BIN 
L2CAP AUDIO 
I LMP I 
HCI: 
- optional 
- for host/module 
Baseband communication 
Physical Physical Bluetooth Radio 
OSI TCP/IP Bluetooth 
Figure 7. Stack Comparison between OSI model, TCP/IP and Bluetooth. 
As discussed earlier, the SDP, RF COMM and TCS-BIN layers of the Bluetooth 
Protocol Stack together provide an interface for higher layer applications and protocols. 
Their procedures, along with those of the L2CAP and AUDIO layers, as well as the LMP and 
Baseband layers, all perform different functions. Apart from small overlaps in functionality 
for adaptation, the services they provide together can be considered equivalent to those of the 
OSI Datalink layer. Additionally, the Baseband and Bluetooth Radio layers share some of 
the duties equivalent to that of the OSI Physical layer. 
For the purposes of the research that is reported in this thesis, the intrusion detection 
system will only be concerned with protecting the airlink between individual nodes in an ad-
hoc network. Hence, it will attempt to detect misuse of the Bluetooth network protocols, and 
not the other protocols that would possibly be overlaying it, such as TCP/IP. 
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3.0 Intrusion Detection Design 
3 .1 System Overview 
Our approach involves adapting the Bluetooth protocol stack to the use of an 
intrusion detection system. Using several modules fitted together to form a complete IDS 
system, it is designed to follow the principles laid out earlier in this thesis. 
The system exists as a somewhat transparent overlay which functions behind the lines 
of the Bluetooth protocol stack to collect trace data from its various components, process it, 
and to make decisions as to the nature of the current situation, as shown in figure 8. Control 
is provided through an interface to the application layer, through which system training can 
be initiated and applications and users can be notified of ongoing events. 
Upon detection of an intrusion, the trace data is logged, and the other nodes in the 
network can be notified. When such a notification is received, it will be incorporated into the 
IDS systems decision process to whether an attack is ongoing or imminent. The IDS system 
is divided into separate components that each has the responsibility for a smaller task. 
Anomaly 
Rule-set 
DB 
Log 
DB 
Service Database Data 
Query Agent (SDB DQA) 
(CC) 
(DCA) 
(DCA) 
(DCA) 
Device Database Data 
Query Agent (DDB DQA) 
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Applications 
- Bl uetooth Profi les 
- Adopted Protocols 
- Stand-alone apps 
SOP RF COMM TCS-BIN 
L2CAP AUDIO 
HCI 
LMP 
Baseband 
Bluetooth Radio 
Figure 8. Bluetooth Protocol Stack with IDS system. 
Sec. 
Mgmt 
The Database Query Agents interact with the databases native to the Bluetooth 
Security Architecture, collecting information as well as reset parameters when needed. Data 
Collection Agents (the concept of a DCA at each level is explained in more detail in section 
3.2) are used to collect data at various levels in the Bluetooth Protocol Stack, and relay it to 
the central Intrusion Detection and Response Engine. This is the heart of the system, which 
evaluates the data collected and handles logging and system training, as well as notifications 
to IDS systems at other nodes in the network for collaboration in the detection of events. The 
actual communication with other nodes is handled through the Communication and Control 
22 
module, which also contains a user interface accessible from the local node only, preventing 
remote entities from taking control of the system. 
The system also has two databases, namely the Anomaly Rule-set, which stores the 
knowledge base for use in detecting intrusions, and the Log database, which stores the log of 
events collected by the system during operation. 
A Bluetooth node does not have a large memory capacity, and so both databases will 
need to be of a finite size to take this limitation into account. The log database will 
furthermore need to be dynamic in storage, so that only a certain amount of log data is kept at 
any one time. 
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3.2 The Data Collection Agents (DCA) 
The primary responsibilities of a DCA is to collect trace data in real time and to 
provide integrity of the trace data while temporarily storing it before relaying it to the 
Intrusion Detection and Response Engine. Depicted in figure 9 are 3 separate DCAs, to 
show that they collect data from between the layers of the Bluetooth Protocol Stack. 
However, the concept ofDCAs is quite flexible, as they can be added as needed, providing a 
degree of scalability to the system. A DCA is needed at each level in order to capture data 
from all levels of the Bluetooth Protocol Stack, since the information available at any one 
level is unique to that level. 
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The information collected pertains to Bluetooth system calls, frame headers and 
trailers at various levels of the protocol stack, as well as other communication activities. 
Pertaining to the layers below the HCI of the Bluetooth Protocol Stack, data is collected 
through the HCI, to allow the system to function under the common usage of separate 
Bluetooth hosts and modules. Above the HCI, data is collected from the parts of the 
Bluetooth protocol stack between HCI and the application layer, i.e. the "native" layers that 
are used regardless of specific application of the particular implementation of Bluetooth. 
Event data is also collected from the Application layer, to ensure proper detection and 
logging. 
The data is collected in the same format as assumed in the Bluetooth Protocol in order 
to create an easily understandable standard for system and data transfer, as well as for 
cooperation between the IDS at different nodes. This is what we call the "Bluetooth 
Equivalent Format", which is explained in more detail in Section 3.5. 
Upon collection the trace data is run through a checksum procedure utilizing an MD5 
[22] algorithm to preserve integrity. Thereafter, both the checksum and data are relayed to 
the central Intrusion Detection and Response Engine (IDRE) for processing and logging. 
The DCAs do not buffer trace data, as they must be able to operate and relay it to the IDRE 
in near real-time. 
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3.3 The Database Query Agents (SDB DQA and DDB DQA) 
The tasks of the Service Database and Device Database Data Query Agents (SDB 
DQA and DDB DQA in figure 10) are very similar to the Data Collection Agents, in that 
they also collect data on behalf of the IDS system. The difference is that they act on the 
databases used for storing security management primitives, and hence have the ability to 
query the databases to relay specific rather than bulk information. The central part of the 
IDS system will issue 
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Figure I 0. The Database Query Agents 
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requests to the DQAs as needed in the processing of the trace data received from the DCAs 
and through notifications from other nodes. 
The DQAs also have the ability to infer new values on the security management 
databases in case of a force of measures issued by the IDRE module as a response to an 
intrusion that has been detected. The two security management databases, the service 
database and the device database, maintain security primitives pertaining to local services 
and peer nodes (or devices). These primitives can be altered, in order to facilitate "Force 
Measures" actions, effectively changing the current security status of known peer nodes. 
Carried out by the DQAs, these actions can force re-authentication for nodes, services or 
both, either related to specific peer nodes or for all connections regardless of context. Access 
can also be denied on a more permanent basis. The format of the information retrieved and 
inferred is the same as that stored by the databases initially, retaining a degree of 
transparency. 
It is important to note that the DQAs do not have the ability to perform these tasks on 
their own initiative (that would be a serious security violation and an easy way to create a 
Denial-of-Service attack) but only on the command of the IDRE. 
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3.4 The Communication and Control module (CC) 
The Communication and Control (CC) module provides an interface to the 
application layer through which a user can control and interact with the IDS system. This is 
also the interface used by the IDS system to notify native applications on its own wireless 
node of an ongoing or imminent intrusion. Shown in figure 11 , the CC module also provides 
a communication interface to IDS systems at other nodes. 
The CC allows for application level control of procedures such as specifying and 
starting training periods and retrieving log data. The system will run on predefined anomaly 
and ruleset 
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Figure 11 . The Communication and Control Module. 
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data until a training period is specified and initiated, either during or after startup. 
Authentication is an important part of the CC module, since in providing a door into 
the IDS system, it must be properly protected. Remote processes and applications cannot 
authenticate with this interface. Instead, a client program allowing a physical user to interact 
with the system is required. Furthermore, there is no method to start or stop the IDS system 
from operating normally, therefore, a countdown timer is placed on the number of training 
periods incurred so as to avoid excessive training operation. 
The communication with other nodes is performed through the application layer and 
the packets can hence be encrypted, encapsulated and inserted into the normal packet stream 
so as to avoid detection by rouge nodes attempting to listen in on the data transfer. It relays 
notifications of ongoing attacks to the IDS systems at other nodes, as well as receives and 
processes information from the IDS systems at other nodes for use by the IDS system at the 
current node. 
Secure communication channels are achieved by using encryption between individual 
IDS systems at different nodes in a network. Our approach involves using the AES 
encryption algorithm in OCB mode [21], to provide a cryptographically sound solution, and 
to provide a double layer of security placed on such packets traversing over the wireless 
medium. Rogaway [21] defines the low-level details of AES in OCB mode, and also 
describes which primitives need to be sent upon encryption, in order to facilitate decoding of 
the message by the recipient. This information entails a nonce, the ciphertext, and finally a 
message authenticity tag. However, no specific packet format is defined in [21]. 
In our employment of this algorithm, key distribution is performed through the user 
interface rather than over the airlink for additional security. The double layer encryption is 
29 
achieved through the addition of baseband encryption of the frames sent between IDS 
systems, and is enforced when the node is using security levels 2 or 3. 
We use notification packets to facilitate the communication between the IDS systems. 
Our design of the Notification Packet format is a unique contribution of this thesis. The 
information we relay in our design format contains identifiers for the node sending the 
Notification Packet, the network (piconet) it belongs to, as well as a trace of the log that 
caused the notification to be sent, which is also of our design. The node and network 
identifiers we use in our design format are equivalent to the addresses used to identify these 
entities in the Bluetooth protocol. As mentioned earlier, we use AES in OCB mode [21] for 
data encryption and authenticity, but the AES OCB mode does not present a packet format in 
itself. 
Figure 12 shows our design format, which is a format on the application layer, as this 
is where the CC module interfaces with the Bluetooth Protocol Stack. We now continue to 
define and discuss the size of our Notification Packet, as well as the individual fields it 
contains. 
Encryption 
0 127 128 130 131 178 179 202 203 2616 617 2745 
I Nonce Slave AM_ADDR I Master BD ADDR I Trans# I Log Trace + Padding Auth. Tag I 
128-bit 3-bit node 48-bit network 24-bit 2414 bits Log Trace 128-bit 
AES identifier identifier seq# AES OCB 
OCB Auth . Tag 
Figure 12. Our design format for the Notification Packet, with AES OCB encryption and authentication. 
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First, we discuss the size of the Notification Packet. The maximum payload capacity 
of a packet on a connectionless L2CAP link, over which data traffic is sent from the 
application level, and which is the type of link that will be used to transmit the Notification 
Packet, is 65533 bytes. However, the maximum size of the payload of a Baseband packet is 
only 2746 bits, or about 340 bytes. To avoid fragmentation or packet loss, we set this latter 
size as the upper limit of any individual Notification Packet to be sent. In essence, it limits 
the size of the packet and increases the likelihood of a successful transmission. Of course, no 
guarantee of successful transmission can be given, as one has to take into account the event 
of being either temporarily or permanently unable to receive. It is this kind of interruption in 
communication that can cause loss of data, inability to join new piconets and inability to 
obtain permission to transmit. We now co11:tinue to explain our packet format in detail, field 
by field. 
Our first field, the Nonce, is the input information needed by the receiver in order to 
decrypt the packet and check its integrity using the Authentication Tag, which we have 
appended to the end of our packet format, as the last field. As mentioned earlier, the AES 
OCB encryption algorithm mode is presented in its entirety in [21]. 
Our next two fields, Slave AM_ADDR and Master BD_ADDR, contain the 
identifiers for the node and network (piconet). To identify the node sending the packet, and 
the network for which it is intended, we have decided to have slaves insert their assigned 
AM_ ADDR together with the master's BD _ ADDR, whereas a master inserts the reserved 
broadcast value as the AM ADDR and it's own BD ADDR. - -
31 
Our Trans# field represents a sequence number, which we use as a means to allow 
protection against replay attacks as well as the use of dynamic keys. 
Our Log Trace + Padding field is 2414 bits long, in order to accommodate the size 
limitation on single Baseband packets and avoid fragmentation, as mentioned earlier. 
Padding is added to fill the void left by the trace data included, if any, in order to make all 
notification messages the same size. The format of the data contained in our Log Trace + 
Padding field is of our design, and comprises the actual notification information; a timestamp 
followed by tuples of the form {Type, Bluetooth_Equivalent_Format}. These data tuples are 
extracted from the Log Database of the IDS system that is sending the notification message, 
and our design of the Log Database is explained in more detail in section 3.5. 
As mentioned before, the CC module is also responsible for receiving and decoding 
notifications that are received from other nodes regarding intrusions. The CC module filters 
data received at the Application level, and upon receipt of a notification message, it is 
extracted from the data stream by the CC module and decrypted. Upon decryption, the 
information is then relayed to the IDRE module for processing. 
As log traces do not necessarily follow any certain size limit, a trace can be spread 
over several Notification Packets distributed during a perceived attack. In this event, each 
Notification Packet is still treated as a separate entity by the receiving system, as no 
guarantee of receipt of any one or all of them can be given. The Notification Packets are also 
not acknowledged, as the sender may not have any way to receive the acknowledgement. 
This is the case if interference, which makes it impossible to receive, is present at the sender, 
and could be caused by a j ammer. 
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3.5 The Databases (Anomaly Rule-set and Log): 
The IDS system incorporates two databases, one for logging trace data, and another 
for storing a knowledge base. Figure 13 shows how these relate to the rest of the system. 
The Log database contains information that is relevant to an ongoing investigation by 
the system, or an intrusion, and information summarizing this data can be relayed through the 
application layer interface to a user or through the CC module to the IDS systems at other 
nodes. An MD5 [22) checksum is run on each entry to ensure the integrity of the data. This 
checksum is used to verify integrity of the data when transmitting summaries to other nodes, 
as well as when the data is retrieved by the user for forensic investigations, and is also stored 
in the database. 
Figure 13. The Anomaly Rule-set Database and the Log Database 
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The Anomaly Rule-set database contains the base of knowledge obtained during a 
training period. The information is consequently updated whenever a training period is 
executed, and the database can provide a permanent storage for this information upon power-
down, depending on the specifics of the Bluetooth implementation on which the IDS system 
is running. This database is also protected with MD5 [22] checksums, and the data is 
verified based on a preset time-interval to ensure its integrity throughout system operation. 
In the event that the data has become corrupted, a notification of this event is propagated to 
the user-interface in the Application layer. The system incorporates the corruption as 
potential evidence in the detection process, and marks it to avoid it being used as a reference 
in the future. 
The size of the actual databases will vary with implementation, but size will remain 
important as Bluetooth devices in general have low memory capacity. As for the Anomaly 
Rule-set database, a knowledge base is to be predefined in order to make it fit the limitations 
in current Bluetooth technology. 
In the Log Database it has to be possible for trace data to be added on a continuous 
basis. This in turn means that a maximum size will need to be assigned, again within the 
limitations of current Bluetooth technology. In order to provide dynamic operation, it will 
function as a timestamp-based queue; once the database is filled up with log entries, the 
oldest entries will be discarded as new entries are added. 
The format of the Log Database entries is essential to cooperation. Our design here is 
a unique contribution of this research. In that in addition to a timestamp, it includes a type 
field, of our design, to define which part of the protocol the information came from and 
thereby also which format it is in, as well as the information collected in the corresponding 
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format. Our format design is shown in figure 14 below. Primarily the information collected 
consists of packet header information, payloads of signaling packets, Bluetooth Radio 
primitives and primitives from the databases employed by the native Security Management 
module. This information is contained in the field called Bluetooth Equivalent Format+ 
MD5 Checksum. 
Timestamp Type Bluetooth Equivalent Format + MD5 Checksum 
32 bits 4 bits Variable Length 
Figure 14. Format of the Log Database Entries 
The three fields in the Log Database data format will now be explained. Our 
Timestamp is from a variable maintained by the IDS system and based on the Bluetooth 
Internal Clock. Our Type field contains a unique identifier to describe which format from the 
Bluetooth Protocol is used for the information in the Bluetooth Equivalent Format field 
(described on the next page) immediately following it. 
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Table 1 shows our specification of the Type field for Log Database Entries. 
Layer Hex Code 
Application 0 
SDP 1 
RF COMM 2 
TCS-BIN 3 
L2CAP 4 
AUDIO 5 
HCI 6 
LMP 7 
Link Controller/Baseband 8 
Radio 9 
Service Database A 
Device Database B 
Security Mgmt. c 
Reserved D-F 
Table 1. Hex encoding of the Type field for Log Database Entries. 
The Bluetooth Equivalent Format is essentially an identical copy of the header, 
signaling payload or service primitive information collected by the DCAs during a trace, both 
for simplicity and also so that it can be recognized by another IDS system at another node 
after receipt of a notification message. The header, signaling payload and service primitive 
information format of the Bluetooth Protocol, is described in its entirety in the Bluetooth 
Specification [8]. Types D through F are classified as Reserved, which means that they are 
used to signify internal formats used by the IDS system to record trace data or events. This is 
used for formats that are not explicitly described, such as the header and signaling payload 
formats, in the Bluetooth Specification. The MD5 checksum is a measure to preserve 
integrity of the data, and is a consequence of integrity checking of data at the IDRE. 
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3.6 The Intrusion Detection and Response Engine (IDRE) 
The Intrusion Detection and Response Engine (IDRE) (Figure 15) is the heart of the 
system. It examines the data from the Data Collection Agents, the Database Data Query 
Agents, and the Communication and Control module, and makes decisions as to whether an 
intrusion is ongoing or imminent, or if the information collected warrants further 
investigation. 
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Figure 15. The Intrusion Detection and Response Engine. 
Logging is initiated upon receipt of suspect trace data, and notifications are sent 
through the Communication and Control module upon detection of an intrusion, for 
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communication with both a physical user and Intrusion Detection Systems at other nodes. 
The data collected is checked for integrity via the appended MD5 checksum before 
processing, and this checksum is stored together with the data if it is logged. The IDRE also 
maintains a 32-bit time variable based on the Bluetooth Internal Clock in order to timestamp 
the entries in the Log database. 
Furthermore, measures to respond to the attack locally can be enforced through the 
other components of the system, to stop ongoing undesired activity. The state of the security 
primitives maintained by the native Bluetooth Security Management module can be reset 
through the DQAs as mentioned earlier in section 3.3, and described in more detail in section 
3.7. Depending on which security primitives are affected, and in which way, this can result 
in specific peer nodes being denied access to certain local services permanently. It can also 
result in temporary loss of access until the remote peer nodes or services can re-authenticate, 
if allowed to do so by the new status of the security primitives. 
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3. 7 System Operation 
Figure 16 is a representation of the operational flowchart of the IDS system, and it is 
explained over the next few paragraphs. The system operates, as before mentioned, in a 
highly transparent manner with the collection and query agents 
Load 
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Rule-set 
true 
Notify 
Receive and Process 
trace data and user interface requests 
Figure 16. System Operational Flowchart 
Incorporate 
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working behind the scenes of the Bluetooth protocol to obtain trace data. 
On power-up, the system checks the Anomaly Rule-set database, to determine 
whether a training period is needed. If so, a training period is entered, either using default 
parameters, or parameters from the application level user interface. When there is no need to 
run a training period, the existing knowledge base is used. Once these actions have been 
completed, the system is fully operational. Trace data is received, checked for integrity and 
processed, then coupled with results from queries to the service and device security 
databases. Requests from the user interface are also received and processed. 
When a positive decision is made as to whether an intrusion is ongoing or not, a new 
notification is issued via the CC module through the secure channel with other IDS systems. 
"Force Measures" is the description of the actions taken to stop the intrusion locally 
as performed on request from the IDRE, and executed by the DQAs (as mentioned earlier in 
section 3.3). The concept behind this idea, is that the service and device databases 
maintained by the Bluetooth Protocol Security Management module contain security 
primitives pertaining to the security status of known peer nodes, related to local services 
available at the current node. These primitives can be changed by the DQAs, effectively 
forcing re-authentication or denied access for peer nodes to services that are currently 
available, hence the name "Force Measures". In summary then, upon detection of an 
intrusion, the security primitives of suspect peer nodes can be changed to force re-
authentication, deny further access either related to specific services, or altogether. 
Upon receipt of notification information from other nodes, it is incorporated as trace 
data into the decision process. If it warrants further investigation, it is logged, otherwise, it is 
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discarded. New training periods may be incurred by commands through the user interface to 
the application layer, for the system to adapt to a new environment if need be. 
All of these tasks, such as the generation of notifications through the CC module and 
responses to intrusions via the DQAs, as well as collection of trace data via the Data 
Collection Agents are performed with transparency, allowing the actual intrusion detection to 
run continuously. 
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4 Case Study 
In considering a case study for the IDS system, several possibilities emerge. 
Examples of intrusions have been developed to demonstrate attacks on the key exchange 
protocol, determination of location, as well as on vulnerabilities in the cipher by Jakobsson 
and Wetzel [12]. The attacks on the key exchange protocol are possible through the use of 
either a brute-force or a man-in-the-middle approach, and may be detected by the IDS by 
keeping a close watch on the databases belonging to Bluetooth's native security architecture. 
The location attack is more an external vulnerability - the ability of an adversary to 
determine another node's physical whereabouts by placing sensors in target areas. Finally, 
the attacks on the SAFER+ cipher are theoretically possible, but deemed impractical due to 
the large overhead involved. 
The authors also show that all these attacks can easily be defended against and 
prevented through small and simple alterations in the protocol. They suggest extending the 
PINs beyond 64 bits, as well as implementing application level encryption and new security 
policies to avoid the attack on the key exchange protocol. Another improvement relates to 
the identification of individual Bluetooth devices; using randomly generated pseudonyms per 
session rather than real identities can circumvent the location attack. Finally, the authors 
recommend replacing the cipher with a more secure algorithm such as AES [21], in order to 
avoid the cipher attacks. Rather than exploring these vulnerabilities and solutions in more 
detail, we suggest their recommendations be taken into account and implemented. 
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In the following case study, the situation where a follow-onjammer is employed by a 
rogue node in order to attempt a take-over of the network, and how the IDS systems at the 
individual nodes respond to the attack, is explored. A follow-on jammer is a jammer that is 
capable of obtaining and mimicking the hopping sequence employed by a given wireless 
node in order to inject interference into the network while that node is attempting to receive. 
Methods to obtain the hopping sequence are discussed in the.paper by Jakobsson and 
Wetzel [12]. To summarize, it is necessary to determine which seed is used to generate the 
pseudo random sequence. The seed is derived either from the inquiring device's own clock 
and the general inquiry access code (when in the inquiry substate of"Page" mode [8]), or 
from the master's clock and device address (when in the connected state [8]). There are only 
32 dedicated channels that are used for inquiry, and a Bluetooth device reveals both its clock 
and device address in responding to an inquiry message. An adversary can therefore obtain 
the seed of the hopping sequence used for Page mode by scanning the dedicated frequencies 
for inquiry messages, and eavesdropping on the responses. The adversary can then 
determine the seed for the piconet hopping sequence used during the connected state because 
the master node will reveal its clock and device address while paging. 
Figure 17 below shows the network considered for the Case Study. It contains a total 
of six nodes, one master (V 1) and five slaves. Each of the nodes has an instance of the IDS 
system as discussed earlier, and hence is fully capable of detecting intrusions. Into this 
network, a rogue node (Rogue Node R) inserts itself, and listens to the traffic sent by the 
victim nodes in order to determine the frequency hopping sequence that is currently being 
used. 
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Figure 17. The Network considered for the Case Study. 
After having obtained the seed to generate the hopping sequence of the piconet, as 
described earlier, the rogue node R goes on to act as a follow-on jammer. This means that it 
mimics the hopping sequence of the nodes it attempts to block and transmits interference 
when they attempt to receive, but lets the airwaves be clear while they transmit. In this case 
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the rogue node only blocks out the node currently acting as the master; node V 1• No other 
nodes are directly affected by this attack. 
We are considering the interference attack on a master node because that effectively 
disables the entire piconet. An attack of this nature against any slave node will only cause 
that slave node to lose the ability to receive. This is of much less consequence, as the 
remaining participants of the piconet, the master node included, can still continue to transmit 
and receive as usual. 
The IDS at node V 1 will collect evidence from all layers, but the evidence of undue 
interference will mainly come from the Baseband and Radio layers (figure 18). Monitoring 
the ability to receive packets allows the intrusion detection system to detect the loss of this 
ability and thereby also the interference. Additionally, the Bluetooth protocol maintains an 
optional Receiver Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI) for power conservation purposes [8][13-
16]. Controlled through the LMP protocol, this RSSI can also provide evidence for intrusion 
detection purposes, in showing the change in power levels requested. The interference 
cannot necessarily be coupled with any legal member of the piconet, and hence the only 
response the IDS takes is to send out the notification message; changing the security 
primitives of the Security Management Architecture will have no effect on the interference. 
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Figure 18. IDS System collecting evidence mainly from layers below HCI 
To describe the events in more detail, the evidence is accumulated and processed by 
the IDS as described in Section 3. Since the interference currently is making it impossible to 
receive, no external notifications are received. Looking at the trace data collected, there is 
evidence of interference from the inability to receive indicated by the monitoring process, 
even though the network was recently up and running. The airlink now looks like an empty 
space to the lower layers of the Bluetooth protocol stack. 
Once a positive decision is made, the IDRE initiates communication to the other 
nodes via the CC module through an encrypted channel. As there is no set time at which this 
is performed, it is impossible for the rogue node R to block the specific reception without 
expanding its range drastically to affect the entire piconet. 
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The notification message sent is comprised of several entities, as earlier described -
including identifiers for the node and network, log trace excerpt and description of the attack. 
Additionally, a notification is also presented to the physical user of node V 1• 
As described earlier, the interference caused by the jammer does not affect the other 
slave nodes, which can still receive and transmit normally. However, the fact that node V1 is 
the master of this particular network means that once it is unable to communicate with the 
others, transmission of data packets will be halted until a new master node can be selected 
and the network be re-established. 
The IDS systems at nodes A, B, C, D and E receive the message and incorporate the 
evidence supplied into their own decision process. Found to be sufficient, they will 
eventually exchange notification messages and also notify the user at each node. 
Finally, they start the process to elect a new master node to re-establish the network. 
Once this procedure is completed (figure 19), the IDS at the new master node forces 
reauthentication. The hopping sequence is also changed in order to prevent further jamming. 
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Figure 19. Reestablishment of the Network 
After having sent out the notification message, node V 1 will stop all transmissions 
and simply let the IDS continue to monitor the evidence until it shows that the interference 
has definitively subsided or disappeared. Thereafter, it will allow the Bluetooth protocol to 
once again enter normal operation. Node V1 may then continue normal operation; i.e. join 
the new network by communicating with the new master as shown in figure 20, or any other 
network for that matter. 
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Figure 20. Node V 1 attempts to join the new network 
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5 Conclusion 
We have developed a design for an Intrusion Detection System for the Bluetooth 
Protocol Stack. This system fulfills all the requirements discussed in the Theory section of 
this thesis, and is well adapted for use specifically with the Bluetooth Protocol as defined in 
the Bluetooth Specification [8]. 
The system functions as a transparent overlay to the protocol and aids in detecting 
and preventing intrusions. Trace data is collected from all layers of the protocol, and the 
detection process relies on a combined Anomaly and Rule-set approach. It furthermore has 
the ability to distribute evidence collected in a connectionless manner, to enable cooperation 
in the network's intrusion detection efforts. 
The system communicates over channels secured by utilizing existing cryptographic 
mechanisms, namely AES [21], for communication. We have designed high level formats 
for the information to be used in this cooperative exchange. However, the low-level details 
pertaining to an actual implementation of the IDS system still need to be designed. 
We have also proposed a format for the storage of trace data collected in a log 
database. This format relies partially on the existing formats defined in the Bluetooth 
Specification [8], but is also designed to incorporate internal formats native to the IDS 
systems at individual nodes as a collective family. 
In summary, the system design developed encompasses full cooperation between IDS 
systems at individual nodes, and thereby increases the likelihood of detecting and preventing 
intrusions as they occur in the wireless medium. Utilizing the existing formats of the 
50 
Bluetooth Specification [8] for trace data storage and distribution through notification, it 
provides a low-cost IDS implementation for the Bluetooth Protocol Stack. 
Finally, we have discussed how our system would function in a situation where the 
master node is affected by ajammer, and shown it to be in accordance with our design 
intentions. 
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6 Future Work 
Future work should begin with an analysis and design of the detection algorithm to be 
used with our IDS system design. Specifically, an algorithm must be adapted or developed 
that can integrate all the multi-layer trace data collected, and correlate the data collected at 
any one layer to that collected at all the other layers, in order to facilitate detection. The 
algorithm must also be capable of performing this in real-time. 
A thorough analysis to design an implementation of a prototype that will function 
with a Bluetooth Protocol Stack implementation should be performed. This prototype should 
then be tested in a network configuration with the ability to simulate attacks in a controlled 
environment to ensure proper system operation, thereby proving our design. 
Other focuses of interest include expanding and evolving the framework to 
encompass and apply to multiple wireless ad-hoc network implementations. This is possible 
since though implementations differ, the principles and conditions governing intrusion 
detection are similar for all systems operating in the wireless ad-hoc environment. Candidate 
technologies for this further research include the IEEE 802.11. 
52 
Appendix 
List of Acronyms 
AES 
Advanced Encryption Standard [21]. 
AM ADDR 
ID value assigned to identify individual slave nodes in a piconet. 
AUDIO 
The audio component of the Bluetooth Protocol Stack. 
BD ADDR 
cc 
DB 
DCA 
DQAs 
Unique device address engraved in all Bluetooth devices. Identifies the master of a 
piconet. 
Communications and Control module. 
DataBase. 
Data Collection Agent. 
Data Query Agents. Refers collectively to SDB DQA and DDB DQA. 
DDBDQA 
Device DataBase Query Agent. 
HCI 
IDRE 
IDS 
LMP 
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Host Controller Interface. Handles communication between host and module in 
implementations of the Bluetooth Protocol Stack where these are separate, i.e. one in 
software, the other in hardware. 
Intrusion Detection and Response Engine. 
Intrusion Detection System. 
Link Management Protocol. Adds encryption and enforces some security measures 
on behalf of the Bluetooth Protocol's Security Mgmt. 
L2CAP 
MD5 
OBEX 
Logical Link and Adaptation Protocol. Handles logical link adaptation for data 
traffic. 
The Message Digest 5 Algorithm [22]. 
Object Exchange Protocol. 
OCB Mode 
OSI 
Operational mode of AES encryption algorithm that allows parallelization of 
authenticated encryption [21]. 
Open Systems Interconnection model. 
PIN 
PPP 
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Personal Identification Number. 
Point-to-Point Protocol. Protocol used for networking, adapted to the Bluetooth 
Protocol Stack. 
RFCOMM 
RSSI 
Serial Communications Interface. Encapsulates data from higher-level layers in a 
fashion that readies it for transmission over the Bluetooth airlink. 
Receiver Signal Strength Indicator. Optionally implemented primitive native to the 
Bluetooth Protocol Stack. Used for power management. 
SAFER+ 
SDP 
Enhanced version of the SAFER-SK128 64-bit block cipher [9]. 
Service Discovery Protocol. Used to discover available Bluetooth services at other 
nodes. 
SDBDQA 
Service DataBase Data Query Agent. 
TCP/IP 
The TCP/IP Protocol Suite. 
TCS-BIN 
Telephony Commands in Binary. Defines operations adapted from telephony 
protocols, such as those native to mobile phones. 
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UDP 
The UDP protocol of the TCP/IP Protocol Suite. 
WAE 
Wireless Applications Environment. 
WAP 
Wireless Application Protocol. 
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